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Analysis of the Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a _-6p-_[_n analysis of the hardware to"
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbiter Hydraulics/Water
Spray Boiler Subsystem.
The hydraulic system provides hydraulic power to gimbal the main
engines, actuate the main engine propellant control valves, move
the aerodynamic flight control surfaces, lower the landing gear,
apply wheel brakes, steer the nosewheel, and dampen the external
tank/umbilical plate at external tank (ET) separation. Each
hydraulic system has an associated water spray boiler which is
used to cool the hydraulic fluid and APU lubricating oil. This
analysis breaks the hydraulic system into four divisions.
o water Spray Boiler (WSB)
Electrical Power Distribution and Control - Water
Spray Boiler (EPD&C - WSB)
o Hydraulics (HYD)
o Electrical Power Distribution and Control - Hydraulics
(EPD&C - HYD)
The IOA analysis process utilized available HYD/WSB hardware
drawings_ schematics and documents for defining hardware
assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of
hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes
and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of
the effect for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the four major divisions of the HYD/WSB subsystem. A summary
of the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented















Figure 1 - HYDRAULICS/WATER SPRAY BOILER OVERVIEW
ANALYSIS SUMMARY
U




3 2/IR 1 2/2146
3/IR
89 3/2R 1 3/32 190
TOTAL
430
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)










The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment




The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing available drawings, schematics and documents to breakdown the
respective subsystem into components and low-level hardware
items. Each hardware item is evaluated for failure mode,
effects, and criticality. These data are documented in the
respective subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the
NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA
analysis approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0
.through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is to be performed and
documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes













Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
l
2.4 HYD/WSB Ground Rules and Assumptions
The HYD/WSB ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were
defined to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the
ground rules and assumptions contained in NSTS 22206.
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3.0 SUBSYST_ DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The hydraulic subsystem is made up of three independent hydraulic
systems, each with its own APU/pump, reservoir, water spray
boiler for APU lube oil and hydraulic fluid cooling, and
distribution systems. A typical system is shown in Figure 2.
Water Spray Boi!er
The water spray boiler (WSB) system consists of three identical
independent units, one for each APU/hydraulic system. Each WSB
is used while its assoqiated APU is active in order to cool the
APU lubricating oil and the Orbiter hydraulic fluid. Each WSB
consists of the following components:
o Water tank with gaseous nitrogen (GN2) pressurization
o Internal boiler
o Electronic controllers (two per system)
o Heaters
o Temperature and pressure Sensors
The WSB stores water in a bellows-type storage tank, which is
pressurized by nitrogen to provide positive water expulsion to
feed the boiler. The WSB system operates in either a pool or
spray mode. The hydraulic fluid and APU lubricating oil pass :
thzough the boiler in a set of tubes which are either immersed _n
water (pool mode) or sprayed with water from three hydraulic
fluid water spray bars and two APU lube oil water spray bars
(spray mode).
During ascent and entry the boiler operates in the pool mode. As
the vehicle ascends, the APU lube oil heats up. Eventually the
boiler water precharge boils off, and the boiler goes into the
spray mode (the hydraulic fluid usually does not heat up enough
during ascent to require any spray cooling). During the lower
part of entry, when the boiler temperature (i.e., the boiling
point of water) reaches 188 degrees F, the WSB returns to the
pool mode. The spray bars begin discharging water to fill the
boiler. As the water reaches the liquid level sensors, the spray
is turned off to prevent the boiler from overfilling. The water
that is boiled off exits the Orbiter through a steam duct located
to the right of the vertical stabilizer.
EPD&C - Water Spray Boiler
The EPD&C support for a typical Water Spray Boiler unit is
illustrated in Figure 3. The EPD&C system provides ac and dc
power to the WSB related transducers, signal conditioners and
















































































wControl Assembly (PCA) provide the 28 Vdc required to operate the
WSB heaters and solenoid and motor operated valves. Hybrid
circuit drivers in aft load control assemblies (LCA) supply power
to the boiler control circuits and GN2 supply control circuits
respectively in the boiler controllers. Control voltage required
to activate the drivers are supplied through boiler control
switches located on Orbiter panel R2.
The WSB has two redundant controllers, A and B. Only one
controller is used at a time. The controller regulates the water
spray and the hydraulic fluid bypass valve (bypasses WSB at 190
degrees F; flows through WSB at 210 degrees F) based on fluid
outlet temperature transducers. Controller A provides for
computation of WSB water tank quantity by the SM GPC based on
water tank temperature transducer and GN2 line pressure readings.
Controller B is identical to Controller A except that the
following outputs are lost.
o H20 quantity computation
o GN2 tank temperature
o GN2 regulator pressure
o H20 tank pressure
o Hydraulic bypass valve position indicator
The water boiler, water tank, and steam vent are equipped with
heatersto prevent freeze-up in orbit. The heaters are cycled
automatically by the WSB controller. Each controller controls







The hydraulic system provides the hydraulic power to operate the
aerosurface controls (elevons, rudder/speed brake, and body
flap), ET umbilical retractors (LH2 and L02), SSME thrust vector
control actuators, SSME control valves, landing gear retract and
deployment, main wheel brakes and antiskid control, and nosewheel
steering. Hydraulic power is generated by APU driven pumps. Two
operational systems are required to provide the maximum
aerosurface rotational rates needed for worst-case descent
conditions.
Each hydraulic system uses a hydraulic fluid reservoir, which
stores and provides fluid to the inlet side of an APU-driven
variable-displacement pump. Upon demand, the fluid is pumped
through a check valve, a filter, and fluid lines which
incorporate a precharged accumulator. The accumulator serves to
absorb system pressure surges by means of a priority valve and
provides pressurization to the reservoir. An electric motor
driven constant displacement circulation pump provides low
pressure hydraulic power for hydraulic system thermal condition-
ing and high pressure hydraulic power for accumulator recharging
during the on-orbit flight phase.
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EPD&C - Hydraulics
The EPD&C support to the hydraulics system is iliUS£rated in
Figure 4. The switches, PBIs and circuit breakers which allow
the crew to configure and control the EPD&C, and the components
of the hydraulic system are located on Panels on the flight deck.
The electrical power is controlled and distributed by use of
power controller assemblies and load controller assemblies.
These assemblies are comprised of buses, resistors, fuses,
diodes, and remote switching devices (remote power controllers,
hybrid circuit drivers, and relays). The power controller
assemblies and load controller assemblies aistribute dc power to
ail_the syst-e-m loads Using remote switching devices. _
The EPD&C provides power to the following hydraulic components.
o Heaters
o Circulation Pumps
o Main Pump Depress Solenoid ...............
o Landing Gear Retract/Circ. Valve
o MPS/TVC Isolation Valve
o Landing Gear Isolation Valve
o Orbiter/ET Umbilical Actuators
o Temperature_and PresSure Transducers
3.2 Interfaces and Locations _. _ .
ii11_!i_!_j_ _ _ and water spray 50iler componentsThe locations of the hydrauiics' i _,_ _
on the Orbiter are shown inFigure 5.
The hydraulics system interfaces with and provides power to the.
aerosurface controls (elevons, rudder/speedbrake,_ and body flap),
ET umbilical actuators (LH2 and L02), SSM_ thrust vector control
actuators, SSME control valves, landing gear retract and deploy
actuators, main wheel brakes and antiskid control, and nosewheel
steering.
The water spray_0iler in_e_{aces_Wi'th the_hy_raulics _system and
the APU to provide cooling for the hydraulic fluid and APU lube
oil. In addition to this cooling interface, the hydraulics
system interfaces with the environmental c0ntrol and life support
system to absorb heat from the Freon heat exchanger.
Both the_ydraulics system_and_the Water spray boiler interface
with the EPD&C system, the Display and Control (D&C)System, the
instrumentation system, and the GPC software. The EPD&C system
provides the electric power and the control assemblies for motors
and valves. The D&C system provides the capability for the crew
to monitor, configure or manually control the systems where
necessary. The instrumentation system processes the performance
parameters required for system monitoring and control. The GPC
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conditioning, accumulator pressure maintenance and landing gear
isolation valve positioning. It also provides priority rate
limiting which automatically manages loads on the remaining
hydraulic systems or system if one or two hydraulic systems are
lost for ascent or entry.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure°6 illustrates the hierarchy of the HYD/WSB hardware and
the corresponding components used for purposes of analysis.






















































































































Figure 9 - WATER TANK ASSEMBLY
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Figure 19 - MAIN
27
PUMP ASSEMBLY










Figure 21 - ET. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
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Figure 25 - EPD&C HYDRAULICS
33
4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis resuits- for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the four major subdivisions
of the HYD/WSB. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions
and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent













































Of these 430 faiiure modes analyzed, 166 w_re determined-to be ...._
PCIs. A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix
D contains a cross reference between each PC, and analysis work-
sheet in Appendix C.











































w4.1 Analysis Results - Water Spray Boiler
The Water Spray Boiler analysis identified 74 failure modes. The
WSB analysis breakdown is illustrated in Figures 7 through ii.
Most of the failure modes were identified as criticality 2/IR,
3/IR or 3/3. Two PCIs were identified and are listed in
Appendix D.
4.2 Analysis Results - EPD&C - Water Spray Boiler
The EPD&C - Water Spray Boiler analysis identified 23 failure
modes. The EPD&C - WSB analysis breakdown is illustrated in
Figures 12 and 13. Most of the failure modes were 3/IR or 3/3.
Three PCIs were identified and are listed in Appendix D.
4.3 Analysis Results - Hydraulic System
The Hydraulics System analysis identified 218 failure modes.
analysis breakdown is illustrated in Figures 14 through 24.
of the failure modes were 2/IR or 3/3. One hundred and four
(104) PCIs were identified and are listed in Appendix D.
The
Most
It should be noted that contamination of all three hydraulic
systems during turnaround servicing was not considered a "single
credible event" in evaluating Redundancy Screen C (see paragraph
B.3.8) since this was considered a ground operations concern.
However, the significant number of inflight hydraulic system
anomalies attributed to contaminafiion suggests that it should be
analyzed independently as a potential cause of critical failure
modes. Without this assumption, all hydraulic failure modes that
list contamination as a cause would fail Screen C.
4.4 Analysis Results - EPD&C -Hydraulics
The EPD&C - Hydraulics analysis identified 115 failure modes.
The analysis breakdown is illustrated in Figure 25. Twenty-eight




Reference documentation available from NASAand Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
JSC-18341, Mechanical systems Console Handbook volume
iI - Systems Briefs, Rev. A PCN-3, 2-7-86
• VS70-958109, Integrated System Schematic Hydraulics,
Rev. E :







VS70-580996, Schematic-Hydraulic Subsystem, Rev. A,
5-30-85
VS70-580999, Schematic-Hydraulic Subsystem, Rev. B,
12-17-84
JSC-12770, shuttle Flight Operati0ns Manual, Volume 9,
Auxiliary Power Unit/Hydraulics, Basic, 3-16-81
JSC 12820, sTs _perational Flight Rules, Final PCN-3,
6-28-85
JSC 11174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C PCN-
5, 9-13-85
• NeTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), !0-10-86
I0. V58 File III, Orbiter Operations and Maintenance
















































































- Abort Once Around
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Assembly
- Abort to Orbit
- Backup Flight System




- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning System
- Direct Current
- Distribution
- Data Processing System
- Display Unit






- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- General Purpose Computer
- Gallons Per Minute




- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Johnson Space Center
- Load Control Assembly
- Liquid Hydrogen
- Liquid Oxygen
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controler
- Main
- Monitoring
- Main Propulsion System
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
- Push Button Indicator
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item

















- Remote Power Controller
- Return to Launch Site
- Systems Management
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Space Transportation System
- Software
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Thrust Vector Control



















Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions



































DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the 7_6_lowing
_plifications and additi--_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-r-ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
J
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
euent where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of on0rbit phase prior to
pa-l-_ed end Of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - d_scription of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and





MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve-_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal To mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at _tion out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at ra_ition out of OpS 2 or oPs 8
J
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first ma_n !anding gear touchdown
_ING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
























DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00c---Eober 1986, was employe-_-with the






The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by'the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance•
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error








All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail. ....
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required, .......
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAS assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 grouHd rule redirection.
i0. Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
ii. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to




























B.3 HYD/WSB-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level. The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety•
l • Where redundant systems perform non-identical functions
(e.g. hydraulics systems 1 and 2), use worst case
system•
RATIONALE: Need to identify worst case effect.
• Pyro's for lowering landing gears are "unlike
redundant" to hydraulic system i.
•
RATIONALE: Pyro's are sufficient to lower the landing
.' gear in absence of an interfering hydraulic
system 1 failure.
In analysis cases where the meaning of hardware item
redundancy seems ambiguous, redundancy is understood to
mean that there is one or more systems that are
redundant to the system in which the hardware item
occurs•
RATIONALE: This is the most c0nservativeassumption
fo_ purposes Qf determining criticality.
• Loss of redundancy means loss of all capability to
perform function.
RATIONALE: Maintain uniform usage within project•
Caps and fittings for quick disconnects are considered
one component.
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption.
• For purposes of criticality evaluations during aborts,
assume SSME induced aborts•





Leaks (GN2, hydraulic fluid, water) are sufficiently
prolonged in time to allow recognition and response•
RATIONALE: This assumption allows for non-trivlal
case analysis.
Contamination of all three hydraulic systems during
turnaround servicing is not considered a "single
credible event" in evaluating Redundancy Screen C.
RATIONALE: This is conside_ed_gr0Und operations
problem although the significant number of
inflight hydraulic system anomalies
attributed to contamination suggests that
it should be analyzed independently as a
potential cause of critical failure modes.
without this assumption, all hydraulic
failure modes that list contamination as a



































This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at--_he
5-_to-mof--6ach sheet_-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like 6r unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
p - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen












































WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSEMBLY
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) WATER SPRAY BOILER










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, FREEZING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SYSTEM DEGRADATION, OVERHEATING OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND LUBE OIL.
LOSS OF SYSTEM. WATER FLOW RATE NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE PROPER
COOLING.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSEMBLY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
r
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58HX4 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER: MC250-0019-0501 .
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _














































LINES AND FITTINGS (GN2-WATER)
LEAKAGE












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
LINES AND FITTINGS (GN2-WATER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR






LOSS OF H20 OR GN2 DEGRADES THE HYDRAULIC FLUID AND LUBE OIL




VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL































WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
HEAT EXCHANGER ASSY
CRITICALITIES




DE_: 2/iR " ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR








B [ P ] C[P ]
CAUSES: CONTAIMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



































ITEM: HEAT EXCHANGER ASSY
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
































CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, POROSITY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND LUBE OIL. OVERHEATING OF FLUIDS AND
LOSS OF SYSTEM AND CONTAMINATION AND STOPPAGE OF THE WATER SPRAY
BARS.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





















































CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, POROSITY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND LUBE OIL.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF SYSTEM.
OVERHEATING OF FLUIDS WITH

























































WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
HEAT EXCHANGER ASSY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R




CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, POROSITY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON SYSTEM COOLING, POSSIBLE MIXING OFAPU LUBE OIL AND
HYDRAULIC FLUID.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-8
INDEPENDENT ORB_TE_RASSESSMENT i















SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)
FAILS TO OPEN












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT TRANSFER WATER TO SPRAY BARS. HYDRAULIC FLUID AND LUBE










































SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)
FAILS TO CLOSE/LEAKAGE












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














CAUSES: BINDING, JAMMING, CORROSION, SHOCK, DAMAGED SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETES H20 SUPPLY, HYDRAULIC FLUID, LUBE OIL OVERHEATS, LOSS OF
SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-10
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL SHORT OR OPEN


















WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGH T PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/i R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58MTI09 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, INSULATION BREAKDOWN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: i_
VALVE REMAINS IN LAST COMMANDED POSITION. SWITCHING REDUNDANT TO
























REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-ll
u
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















BOILER TANK TEMP SENSORS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
BOILER TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS:













CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE READINGS TO THE CONTROLLER. OPEN CIRCUIT WOULS SEND "COLD"
TEMP READINGS TO THE CONTROLLER. REDUNDANT HEATERS FOR BOILER
AND WATER TANK ARE AVAIABLE USING REDUNDANT CONTROLLER.
REFERENCES :
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















BOILER TANK TEMP SENSORS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
BOILER TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE READING (HOT) TO THE CONTROLLER CAUSING THE HEATERS TO BE
TURNED OFF BY THE CONTROLLERS UNTIL HEATERS OR CB OPEN_ H20 IN
THETANK WOULD FREEZE. REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL ....
OPERATION TO BOILER AND WATER TANK HEATERS.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
























ITEM: BOILER TANK TEMP SENSORS
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE











WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
BOILER TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/! R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R




CAUSES: VIBRATION, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRACTIC SIGNALS TO THE CONTROLLER RESULTING IN ERRACTIC TEMP
CONTROL OF THE BOILER AND WATER TANK. REDUNDANT HEATERS




VST0-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 114 ABORT:
ITEM: BOILER TANK HEATERS
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)















WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
BOILER TANK HEATERS
CRITICALITIES

















HEATERS PREVENT A FREEZEUP IN ORBIT. THE TANK IS EXPOSED TO
SPACE THROIUGH THE STEAM DUMP NOZZLE. SWITCHING TO THE REDUNDANT
















VS70-S80999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL l
J
I





















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
BOILER TANK HEATERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:















A SHORT TO GROUND WILL CAUSE THE HEATER ELEMENT CB TO OPEN AND
THE EFFECT WILL BE THE SAME AS FOR ELECTRICAL THE OPEN CONDITION.
SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
w

















STEAM VENT RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN











WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
STEAM VENT RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: CORROSION, JAMMING, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
VALVE REQUIRED IF STEAM DUMP NOZZLE FLOW IS RESTRICTED (SECOND


















VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
u
HE














ITEM: STEAM DUMP NOZZLE
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
STEAM DUMP NOZZLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R




CAUSES: LOSS OF HEATER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING BOILER OPERATION THE STEAM WOULD HAVE NO ESCAPE ROUTE,
ACTIVATING THE STEAM VENT RELIEF VALVE. LOSS OF SYSTEM.
REDUNDANT CONTROLLER WILL RESTORE NORMAL/OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12

















HYDRAULIC/LUBE OIL WATER FILTERS
LOSS OF FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) WATER SPRAY BOI_R
2) WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA






NO WATER FLOW TO HYDRAULIC OR LUBE OIL HEAT EXCHANGERS.













































STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
STEAM DUMP NOZZLE
STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: , 50V58NZi (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FALSE READINGS (HOT) TO THE CONTROLLER CAUSING THE HEATER TO BE
TURNED OFF. THE SHORT WOULD CAUSE THE HEATER 2ND OR CB TO OPEN.




VST0-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL



























WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
STEAM DUMP NOZZLE
STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR r- -
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3








CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE READINGS TO CONTROLLER. OPEN CIRCUIT WOULD SEND "COLD" .....
TEMP READINGS TO THE CONTROLLER. REDUNDANT INDICATOR B IS
AVAILABLE USING REDUNDANT CONTROLLER . HEATERS STAY ON
CONTINOUSLY NO ADVERSE AFFECT.
REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL CYCLING.






































STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR
OUT OF TOLERANCE










WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
STEAM DUMP NOZZLE
STEAM DUMP NOZZLE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR






ERRATIC SIGNALS TO THE CONTROLLER. VARIABLE TEMPERATURE CONTROL
OF THE NOZZLE. REDUNDANT CONTROLLER AVAILABLE TO RESTORE NORMAL
OPERATION. POSSIBLE RESTRICTED FLOW.
REFERENCES :
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
T
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 122 ABORT:
ITEM: STEAM NOZZLE HEATERS



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




CAUSES: INSULATION BREAKDOWN, CORROSION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE : _ _
SHORT WILL CAUSE CB TO OPEN CAUSING FREEZING OF THE H20, BLOCKING
THE STEAM VENT. OVERHEATING OF HYDRAULIC FLUID, AND LUBE OIL






















VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL_ I
























BOILER WATER FILL AND DRAIN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
BOILER H20 FILL AND DRAIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBI T: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING / SAFING: 2/IR









CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC, DEGRADATION OF COOLING OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND
LUBE OIL DURING ENTRY WITH LOSS OF APU/SYSTEM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
SYSTEM DUE TO LUBE OIL OVERHEATING ON ASCENT CANNOT SUSTAIN
POOLING.
(CAP - CONSIDERED PART OF ASSEMBLY.)
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
BOILER H20 DRAIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE • HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [NA ]. B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: , .50V58HX4 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CORROSION, BINDING, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATiONALE: ....-
CANNOT DRAIN WATER BOILER. REMOVE AND REPLACE QUICK DISCONNECT.
























































WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
LUBE OIL DRAIN
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: LUBE OIL DRAIN
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE











WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
LUBE OIL DRAIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:

















LOSS OF APU GEARBOX LUBE OIL, POSSIBLE LOSS OF APU.





















VS70-SS0999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
mm !
mm
























































CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREVENTS PULSING. INABILITY TO COOL HYDRAULIC FLUID AND LUBE OIL
AFTER SECOND FAILURE. SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
LIQUID LEVEL SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: , /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50q58HX4 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALLOWS PULSING WHEN LUBE OIL TEMP >250. SWITCH TO REDUNDANT
CONTROLLER B. NO MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12






































ITEM: LIQUID LEVEL SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: , 50V58HX4 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
c[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC COOLING AND WATER CONTROL REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES
NORMAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12

















LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS HOT CONDITION, OUT OF TOLERANCE












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT ?HASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE SPRAYING OF WITH POSSIBLE DEPLETION OF H20, LIMITED RUN
TIME. SW. TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER. LOSS OF SYSTEM WITH SECOND
FAI_/YRE.
















































LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS COLD CONDITION, OUT OF TOLERANCE












WATER SPRAY BOILER ASSY
LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE HEATING OF LUBE OIL. SW. TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER.
LOSS OF COOLING AND SYSTEM WITH SECOND FAILURE.
REFERENCES :
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER








FLIGHT PHAS _. HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL:












CAUSES: FATIGUE, WELD FLAW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ •
LOSS OF H20 TANK BY BURSTING COULD CAUSE LOSS A ADJACENT SYSTEMS.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THERMAL INSULATION ON ALL WSB'S. POSSIBLE LOSS























VS70-SS0999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
m
[]






















LEAKAGE - H20 EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R




CAUSES: FATIGUE, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THERMAL CONTROL RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF WSB SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE - GN2 INTERNAL-EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER






























CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF GN2 THROUGH THE BELLAWS OR TANK PREVENTS THE EXPULSION


















VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL mm
mm













ITEM: WATER TANK FILL
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) WATER TANK ASSY























CAUSES: CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) WATER TANK ASSY







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA • RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR "AOA: 2/iR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEGRADATION OF HYDRAULIC AND LUBE OIL COOLING.






















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-37
I
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













LOSS OF TEMP CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) WATER TANK ASSY







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT





REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATERS WOULD NOT BE TURNED ON. NO H20 TANK TEMP CONTROL.
SELECTING REDUNDANT CONTROLLER REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RETURNS






VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL


















LOSS OF TEMP CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) WATER T_K ASSY
























CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORT TO GROUND WILL CAUSE THE HEATER ELEMENT AND/OR THE CB TO
OPEN AND THE EFFECT WILL BE THE SAME AS FOR THE OPEN CONDITION,





































ITEM: WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58HX4 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE READINGS TO CONTROLLER A. FALSE READINGS WILL CAUSE THE
H20 QUANTITY CALCULATIONS TO BE IN ERROR.
REFERENCES :
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL

















WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, SHORT
EFFECTSfRATIONALE :
FALSE READINGS (HOT). ERRONEOUS QUANTITY CALCULATION. HEATER
















REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12 i
!
m
















WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR
OUT OF TOLERANCE













WATER TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
k
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/i TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/11
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATo: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 5058HX4 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FATIGUE, WELD FLAW
EFFECTS/RATi0NA ,
LOSS OF GN2 TANK BY BURSTING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ADJACENT
SYSTEMS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF THERMAL INSULATION ON ALL WSB'S.












































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























CAUSES: FATIGUE, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIO_ALE:
LOSS OF GN2 PREVENTS EXPULSION OF H20 TO THE BOILER RESULTING IN
THE LOSS OF COOLING AND THE SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS7,7-S80999B, SPACESHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL




































ITEM: GN2 REGULATOR VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





























A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 50V58HX4(VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FULL GN2 PRESSURE, 2500 PSIG, WOULD OPEN THE GN2 RELIEF VALVE
WHICH WOULD STAY OPEN UNTIL THE PRESSURE REDUCES TO THE RELIEF





VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/!R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: .....
NO GN2 PRESSURE TO THE H20 TANK. NO THERMAL CONTROL OF THE



































GN2 REGULATOR RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE













GN2 REGULATOR RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR




CAUSES: CONTAIMINATION, CORROSION, DAMAGED SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE H20 TANK GN2 WOULD ESCAPE THROUGH THE OPEN RELIEF VALVE. NO
PRESSURE FOR THE H20 TANK. NO WATER SPRAY CAPABILITY. LOSS OF
SYSTEM ON ASCENT WHEN LUBE OIL TEMP EXCEEDS LIMITS. LOSS OF
SYSTEM IN DE-ORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















GN2 REGULATOR RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN













GN2 REGULATOR RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














CAUSES: CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT NEED SECOND FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12



































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR




CAUSES: JAMMING, CORROSION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO H20 TANK PRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF THERMAL CONTROL OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID AND LUBE OIL. LOSS OF SYSTEM IF LUBE OIL COOLING LOST.
u REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
u


















FAILS TO CLOSE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM
























































ITEM: GN2 SHUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM














































REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-51
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONO_IT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA KTO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B _[NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58PD28(VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER: _E276"00_2-0013
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-SS0999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL





































ITEM: GN2 FILL DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 50V58PD28 (VS70-580999B)
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0013
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 TANK PRESSURIZATION. DEGRADATION OF HYDRAULIC AND




VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
i



















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC _
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT VENT DURING H20 TANK FILLING. CANNOT CHECK H20 QUANTITY
DURING FILLING.
REFERENCES: VST0-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL






































ITEM: GN2 VENT DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE (EXTERNAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER
2) GN2 SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
•ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR • ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DAMAGED SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURE. DEGRADED COOLING OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND
APU LUBE OIL. POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ONASCENT DUE TO
HIGH LUBE OIL TEMPS. CAP AND DISCONNECT CONSIDERED ONE UNIT.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
U
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-55
zINDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT















GN2 TANK TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS HIGH TEMP-OUT OF TOLERANCE













GN2 TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES


















THE ERRONEOUS SIGNALS WOULD RESULT IN FALSE H20 QUANTITY


















VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL J
J
J

















GN2 TANK TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS LOW TEMP-OUT OF TOLERANCE














GN2 TANK TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
















THE ERRONEOUS SIGNALS WOULD RESULT IN FALSE H20 QUANTITY







VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-57
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GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT













GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _
NO OUTPUT FROM THE POTENTIOMETER TO CONTROLLER A. NO MONITORING




















VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
U
D






















GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT













GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:













CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO OUTPUT FROM THE POTENTIOMETER TO CONTROLLER A.
OF GN2 TANK PRESSURE.
NO MONITORING
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12

















GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR
OUT OF TOLERANCE













GN2 TANK PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES

















ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF SENSOR.
INDICATIONS.






































ITEM: GN2 REGULATOR OUT PRESSURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: vIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM THE POTENTIOMETER TO CONTROLLER A. THE GN2




VS70-580999B, SPACESHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
= =
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-61
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GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
















• ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO THE CONTROLLER.
CAII2ULATION.
ERRONEOUS H20 TANK QUANTITY
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12



































ITEM: GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
FAILURE MODE:PHYSICAL BINDING













GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: CORROSION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STATIC POTENTIOMETER OUTPUT. NO CHANGE IN H20 QUANTITY DISPLAY.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
OUT OF TOLERANCE













GN2 REGULATOR PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


























VS70-S80999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL g
W


















FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBS YS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /N A






LOSS OF GN2 PRESSURE TO WATER TANK RESULTS IN NO COOLING OF
HYDRAULIC AND LUBE OIL. LOSS OF SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:

















HYDRAULIC BYPASS VALVE _
FAILS IN HEAT EXCHANGER POSITION















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:














CAUSES: _ COMTAMINATION, JAMMING, BINDING, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ :
ON ASCENT THE HYDRAULIC FLUID DOES NOT REQUIRE COOLING. WITH THE
LUBE OIL SPRAY VALVE OPEN THE HYDRAULIC FLUID RECEIVES THE SAME
COOLING ASTHE LUBE OIL. TH_S..............COULD AFFECT THE CIRC PUMP
OPERATIONS WARMING THE HYDRAULIC FLUID.






























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 . RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R










CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF HYDRAULIC FLUID, OVERHEATING OF HYDRAULIC FLUID,
LOSS OF SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS IN BYPASS POSITION















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA . RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL:
ONORB IT: 2/1R AOA:











CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, BINDING, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _..........._ _ .... _
NO THERMAL CONTROL OF HYDRAULIC FLUID, EXCESSIVE HEATING OF LUBE
OIL WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF SYSTEM ON ASCENT. OVERHEATING OF



















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-68
l
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DAMAGED SEAT, WEAK SPRING, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE WOULD DEPLETE THE HYDRAULIC FLUID.




VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-69
k
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RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR .
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R •AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, VIBRATION
EF?ECTS/RATIONA_ : ___T____ _
WITH THE VALVE ON THE OPEN POSITION HYDRAULIC FLUID WILL BYPASS
THE WSB RESULTING IN THE FLUID EXCEEDING THE TEMP LIMIT OF 275
DEGREES F. FAILING TO CLOSE HAS NO EFFECT DURING ASCENT. THIS






































ITEM: HYDRAULIC RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDN/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: BINDING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH THE VALVE IN THE CLOSED POSITIONAND THE BYPASS VALVE
OPERATIVE THERE IS NO DEGRADATION OF THE SYSTEM UNDER NORMAL FLOW
CONDITIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 171 ABORT:
ITEM: HYDRAULIC BYPASS VALVE MOTOR

















HYDRAULIC BYPASS VALVE MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R _ _
DEORBIT: 3/1 R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE REMAINS IN LAST DRIVEN POSITION. IF LAST POSITION WAS
BYPASS, NO FLUID COOLING. IF IN HX POSITION, ALL FLUID WOULD
FLOW THROUGH THE HX UNDER NORMAL FLOW CONDITIONS. SWITCH TO




















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-72
D
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HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT



















CAUSES: CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORTED XDUCER WOULD SEND A COLD TEMP READING TO THE CONTROLLER
CAUSING THE BYPASS VALVE TO GO TO THE BYPASS POSITION RESULTING
IN NO COOLING OFTHE FLUID. SWITCHING TO THE REDUNDANT
CONTROLLER WOULD RESTORE NORMAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-73
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR
OUT OF TOLERANCE













HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: ' /NA RTLS:













CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
ERRONEOUS READINGS TO CONTROLLER WOULD RESULT IN ERRATIC CONTROL
















VS70-S80999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL I
m
























HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT













HYDRAULIC BYPASS/RELIEF VALVE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL:












CAUSES: CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
AN OPEN TRANSDUCER WOULD SIGNAL A HIGH TEMP TO THE CONTROLLER,
THIS WOULD START THE WATER SPRAY DEPLETING THE H20. THERE IS A
REDUNDANT SENSOR IN THE VALVE. SWITCHING TO THE REDUNDANT
CONTROLLER WOULD RESTORE NORMAL OPERATION.
REFERENCES :
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















LOSS OF AC VOLTAGE



































LOSS OF AC VOLTAGE TO BOILER CNTRL/PWR/HTR SWITCH. LOSS OF ALL












































FAILS TO TRANSFER TO GROUND TEST POSITION
































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, LOSS OF POWER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CHECKOUT OF WATER SPRAY BOILER INSTRUMENTATION DURING
PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT. NO LOSS OF FUNCTIONS.




REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-77
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BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SW_
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM SELECTED CONTROLLER










WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2























CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT TO PCA AND BOILER CONTROL SW. LOSS OF CONTROLLER
OUTPUTS RESULTING LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND APU LUBE OIL
COOLING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF SYSTEM ON ASCENT. SWITCH TO REDUNDANT



































BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SW
FAILS TO CLOSE IN SELECTED CONTROLLER POSITION











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SW ($41)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/ 1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2(VS70-580II9E)
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] c [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO POWER TO CONTROLLER THROUGH PCA AND BOILER CONTROL SWITCH.
LOSS OF HEATERS. LOSS OF HYRAULIC FLUID AND APU LUBE OIL
COOLING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF SYSTEM ON ASCENT. SWITCHING TO
REDUNDANT CONTROLLER RESTORES NORMAL OPS.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
L
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-79
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WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
BOILER CNTRL SW (S38)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR A0A: 2/iR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




B [NA ] c[P]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CB OPENS-NO OUTPUT TO DRIVER TO CONTROLLER CONTROL CIRCUITS.
LOSS OF WSB.





































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
2) PANEL R2




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2 (VS70-580119E)
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REFERENCES: VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: RESISTOR-CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K, 3/4W)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
RESISTOR-CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K 3/4 W)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATo: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:











































RESISTOR-VOLTAGE DIVIDER (12K, I/4W)
OPEN











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
RESISTOR-VOLTAGE DIVIDER (12K 1/4W)
CRITICALITIES















B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






V70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL II,
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-83
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FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF VOLTAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

































CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VOLTAGE TO WSB CONTROLLER AND THE GN2 SHUTOFF VLV.





















VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL m
g
























BOILER N2 SUPPLY SW
LOSS OF OUTPUT











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
BOILER N2 SUPPLY SW ($44)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT















CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND (A OR B CONTROLLER CONTACTS)
EFFECTS/RATIONALEi
CB OPENS, NO OUTPUT TO DRIVER.
ENERGIZED.
REDUNDANT CONTROLLER COIL REMAINS
REFERENCES: VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-85
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: BOILER N2 SUPPLY SW -
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE











WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
PANEL R2
BOILER N2 SUPPLY SW ($44)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: "A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2 (VS70-580119E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK (A OR B CONTROLLER
CONTACTS)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO OUTPUT TO DRIVER. VALVE STAYS OPEN.






































































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LCA DRIVER SUPPLYING CONTROL VOLTAGE TO CONTROLLER, OR




VS70-580II9E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-87
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LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
2) LOAD CONTROL ASSY























CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .............
LCA DRIVER CONDUCTS CONTINUOUSLY (28V OR GN2 SHUTOFF VLV). NO




















VS70-S80119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
m
I




















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




























CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A PCA RPC RESULTING IN LOSS OF 28V FOR HEATERS, VALVE





VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
w--










FAILU_ MODE: FAI_ ON































CAUSES: VIB_TION, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:





















VS70-580119E, SPACE S_TTT._ SYSTEMS _DBOOK, VOL
D 7
m



































WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
AFT PCA
ISOLATION DIODE (AICR 6,8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: . 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V7,6AI35 (VS70-580119E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROLLER OUTPUTS. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID AND APU LUBE
OIL COOLING. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. SWITCH TO REDUNDANT
CONTROLLER TO RESTORE NORMAL OPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-91
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















LOSS OF ISOLATION (AlCR5,7)













ISOLATION DIODE (AICR 5,7)
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHORT
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_.:
LOSS OF ISOLATION BETWEEN CONTROL BUSES. BUS VOLTAGE DIFFERENCE










































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN OR SHORT, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROL OF: HEATERS, VALVES, SENSORS SPRAY, BYPASS, H20
QUANTITY CALCULATIONS. SWITCHING TO CONTROLLER B WILL RESTORE
FUNCTIONS EXCEPT GN2 TANK TEMP, GN2 REG. PRESSURE H20 TANK TEMP.
HYD. BYPASS POSITION INDICATOR.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
i-I
m
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-93
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT















CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL DRIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RANDOM OPERATION OF VALVES AND HEATERS, INCORRECT H20 QUANTITY
CALCULATIONS. SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER.











































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, ELECTRICAL SHORT OR OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUNCTION, POSSIBLE LIMITED RUNTIME OR LOSS OF SYSTEM.




VS70-580999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER.ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS :













CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIFT, CORROSION, VIBRATION
EFFE CTS/_TI ONALE : " _
RANDOM OPERATION OF VALVES AND HEATERS SWITCH TO REDUNDANT _
CONTROLLER.
REFERENCES: VS70-S80999B, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
































ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT (CONTROLLER)



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR CONTROLLER FUNCTIONS (28V, GN2 SHUTOFF VLV).
REDUNDANT CONTROLLER AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL OPS.
REFERENCES: VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
_ II, SECT 12
m

















HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT (CONTROLLER)
CONTINUOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) WATER SPRAY BOILER - EPD&C
2) WSB CONTROLLER
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LQCATION: 55V76A122 (VS 70-580119E)
PART NUMBER: _
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
ENABLE CONTROLLER/GN2 SHUTOFF VLV DRIVER CONDUCTS CONTINUOUSLY.
CONSTANT OUTPUT SIGNAL, NO EFFECT SWITCH TO REDUNDANT CONTROLLER


















VS70-580119E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL R
B
u















FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, GN2, THRU SEAL ASSY.

































A[2 ] B[P] C[P]




LOSS OF ACCUMULATOR GN2 PRESSURE AND RESULTANT LOSS OF RESERVOIR
BOOTSTRAP PRESSURE CAUSES POSSIBLE CIRC. PUMP AND MAIN PUMP
CAVITATION AND PUMP DAMAGE. CONTINUOUS CIRC. PUMP OPERATION WILL
PROVIDE HEAD PRESSURE FOR MAIN PUMP STARTUP.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-99
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, HYD. FLUID, THRU SEAL ASSY.












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LALq_ CH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR





A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
50V58AUI0, 11, 12, (VS70-580999)
MC621-0035-0008
CAUSES : SEAL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES

































FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, (RUPTURE), CYLINDER












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]





LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/RUPTURE CAUSES LOSS OF ALL GN2 AND
HYDRAULIC FLUID. EFFECT OF POTENTIAL SCHRAPNEL IS UNKNOWN.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999


















PHYSICAL BINDING, JAMMING, PISTON












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:




LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. GN2 PRESSURE WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE



































FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS INDICATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58AUI0, ii, 12,
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
(VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOW ACCUMULATOR GN2 PRESURE.POSSIBLE EXCESSIVE CIRC. PUMP CYCLES
AND POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO CIRC. PUMP DUE TO CAVITATION IF NOT
CORRECTED ON GROUND.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-I03
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: OFFSCALE HIGH/LOW












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 _
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58AUI0, ii, 12, (VS70-580999)
P.ART NUMBER:
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
































FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




50V58AUI0, ii, 12, (VS70"580999)
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, GALLING, SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OVERPRESSURE IN PISTON/CYLINDER CAVITY. POSSIBLE GN2 IN





REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-I05
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RELIEF VALVE _
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (INTERNAL LEAK)





























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
50V58AUI0, Ii, 12, (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, GALLING, SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












































LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACCUMULATOR ASSY






















A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 50V58MT520, 527, 534 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MUST RELY ON RESERVOIR PRESSURE AND LINE PRESSURES TO IDENTIFY




REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 50V58MT520, 527, 534 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONAT_: .........
MUST RELY ON RESERVOIR PRESSURE AND LINE PRESSURES TO IDENTIFY

















REPORT DATE Z2/23/86 C-i08
w
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACCUMULATOR ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBERi 50V58MT520, 527, 534 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MUST RELY ON RESERVOIR PRESSURE AND LINE PRESSURES TO IDENTIFY





REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-I09
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ACCUMULATOR ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58FJ6, 7, 8 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ACCUMULATOR GN2 PRESSURE AND RESULTANT LOSS OF RESERVOIR
BOOTSTRAP PRESSURE CAUSES POSSIBLE CIRC. PUMP AND MAIN PUMP
CAVITATION AND PUMP DAMAGE. CONTI_OUS CIRC PUMP OPERATION WILL









































FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (GN2) THRU SEAL ASSY
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























B [NA ] C [NA ]




LOSS OF TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION FUNCTION. NO EFFECT ON HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM. EFFECT ON SSME'S ARE UNKNOWN, HENCE CRITICALITIES DO NOT




REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-Ill
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (HYD. FLUID) THRU SEAL ASSY.
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [p] c[P]




LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES PUMP











































PHYSICAL BINDING, JAMMING, PISTON
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:























B [NA ] C [NA ]




LOSS OF TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION FUNCTION. NO EFFECT ON HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM. EFFECT ON SSMEgS UNKNOWN, HENCE CRITICALITIES DO NOT
REFLECT EFFECT ON SSME'S.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999












ITEM: GN2 FILL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (GN2)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SSME HYD. ACCUM. ASSY





















A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58JIS, 19, 20 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
LOSS OF TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION FUNCTION. NO EFFECT ON HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM. EFFECT ON SSME'S UNKNOWN, HENCE CRITICALITIES DO NOT









































FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, (RUPTURE), CYLINDER
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58AUS, 7, 9 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/RUPTURE CAUSES LOSS OF HYDRAULIC























LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]




DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






































LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




50V58MT54, 55, 56 (VS70-580999)
ME449-0177-6178
C [NA ]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-I17 °
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS READING
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















C [NA ] _
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58MT54, 55, 56 (VS70-580999)
ME449-0177-6178 _ _
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:































ITEM: GN2 PRESSURE GAGE
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SSME HYD. ACCUM. ASSY


























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
5.0V58AU5, 7, 9 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:























LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) SSME HYD. ACCUM. ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATIQN:
PART NUMBER:
50V58AUS, 7, 9 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


































ITEM: AC INDUCTION MOTOR
FAILURE MODE: NO MOTOR POWER OUTPUT TO CIRC. PUMP
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CIRC. PUMP ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: • 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58PPI, 2, 3 (VS70-580999) .
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL SHORT, ELECTRICAL OPEN CIRCUIT, INVERTER
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BOOTSTRAP ACCUMULATOR REPRESS CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF
HYDRAULIC THERMAL CONTROL CAPABILITY ON ONE SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999; JSC-18341, PCN-3
w
REPORT DATE 12f23/86 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 427 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: INVERTER
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF ELECTRIC POWER TO CIRC. PUMP INDUCTION
MOTOR.
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRC. PUMP ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT





REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
..... g z








CAUSES: ELECTRICAL SHORT, ELECTRICAL OPEN CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF BOOTSTRAP ACCUMULATOR REPRESS CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF









































LOSS OF HYDRAULIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRC. PUMP ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58PPI, 2, 3 (VS70-580999)
CAUSES: LOSS OF ELECTRICAL MOTOR OUTPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/LOSS OF HYDRAULIC OUTPUT
FROM LOW PRESSURE PUMP RESULTS IN LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID THERMAL
CONTROL AND ACCUMULATOR REPRESS CAPABILITY. HYDRAULIC FLUID
COMPONENT TEMP BELOW -40 DEGREES IS DEFINED AS LOSS OF
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999; JSC 20923, PCN i; JSC-18341, PCN-3


















LOSS HYDRAULIC OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRC. PUMP ASSY




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58PPI, 2, 3 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER:
c[P]
CAUSES: LOSS OF ELECTRIC MOTOR OUTPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, CON_TAM INATION .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC THERMAL CONTROL CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF .........
CAPABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR IN ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IF COUPLED WITH A GN2
OR HYDRAULIC LEAK.




































PRESS ACTIVATED RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CIRC. PUMP ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT











B[P] C [ P]
LOCATIOn: 50V58PPI, 2, 3 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC284-0438-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DAMAGED SEAT, SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OR DEGRATION OF CIRC. PUMP THERMAL CONTROL CAPABILITY.
ABILITY TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR IS NO AFFECTED.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999; JSC-18341, PCN-3

















PRESS ACTIVATED RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CIRC. PUMP ASSY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT


















HIGHTER THAN NORMAL HYDRAULIC PRESSURE DURING CIRC. PUMP











REFERENCES: VS70-580999; JSC 18341, PCN-3
I





















FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58MVI6, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DAMAGED SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYRAULIC SYSTEM/LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES PUMP




REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
FAILS TO SWITCH (CLOSE)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRC. PUMP ASSY























A [NA ] B [NA ]







CAUSES: PILOT VALVE FAILURE, UNLOADER VALVE FAILURE, BLOCKED
FILTER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















REFERENCES: VS70-580999; VS70-958102; JSC-18341, PCN-3
g
u





















PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRC PUMP ASSEMBLY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT





REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES
PUMP CAVITATION AND LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999










FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W, DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRC. PUMP ASSY








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 ......
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3_i
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58PV29, 30, 31 (VS70-S80999)
MC284-0438-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SEAT OR BALL DAMAGE, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

























































PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
PILOT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:




CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR. PRESSURE WILL
REMAIN LOW SINCE FLOW FROM HIGH PRESSURE CIRC. PUMP IS INTO
SYSTEM CIRCULATION LINES AT LOW (350 PSIA) PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999; VS70-958102; JSC-18341, PCN-3
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










INTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM HIGH PRESS TO RETURN LINE












PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
PILOT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: /NA ,
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: /NA
ONDRBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/5 __ i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS.: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58PV29, 30, 31 (VS70-580999) ....
PART NUMBER: MC284-0438-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SEAT OR BALL DAMAGE, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE WILL DECREASE AND REQUIRE REPRESSURIZATION.























































PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
FILTER
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]










REFERENCES: VS70-580999, VS70-958102, JSC-18341, PCN-3
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
FILTER
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F 3
I_OCATION: 50V58PV29, 30, 3i (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC284-0438-0001 ....
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINATION IN THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.











































PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE












PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE (UNLOADER VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 ' RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58PV29, 30, 31 (VS70-580999)
MC284-0438-00DI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR. FLOW IS FROM HIGH PRESS PUMP
TO LOW PRESS (350 PSIA) SYSTEM OUTLET.





REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-135
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN












PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE .....
PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE (UNLOADER VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: , /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:








A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:




NO EFFECT. THE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE WILL EXCEED EXPECTED VALUE.


















































PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE












PRESS ACTUATED CONTROL VALVE
PRESS. ACTIVATED BYPASS VALVE (UNLOADER VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58PV29, 30, 31 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC284-0438-0001
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SEAT OR BALL DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CIRC. PUMP WILL NOT REPRESSURIZE ACCUMULATOR. PRESSURE WILL
REMAIN LOW SINCE FLOW FROM HIGH PRESSURE CIRC. PUMP IS IN TO
SYSTEM CIRCULATION LINES AT LOWER (350 PSIA) PRESSURE.
_=_
= REFERENCES: VS70-580999; VS70-958102; JS'C-18341, PCN-3













FAILLE MODE: INTE_AL T._A_GE












P_SS AC_ATED CON_OL VALVE
CHECK V_VE
__CRI_!CALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
P_LA_CH: 3/3 RT_ :
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA:
•DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/IR








50V58PV29, 30, 31 (VS70-580999)
MC284-0438-0001
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, S_T DAMAGE
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: ............ :_:.....
POSSIB_ CIRC. PUMP D_AGE FROM _CK P_SS_ AT ST_P.
ACCUMULATOR_P_RESS_ WILL BLEED Dow/__CAU_GHIGHE_T_HANEXPECTED
CIRC. PUMP CYCLES TO KEEP ACCUMULATOR CHARGED. BACK_FLOW THRU
FILTER COULD CONCENTRATE CONTAMINANT IN UNLOADER VALVE.














































LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58MT8, 17, 26 (VS70-580999)
PARTNUMBER: ME499-0177-6162
C [NA ]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. OUTPUT USED TO MONITOR CIRC. PUMP OPERATION.
MEASUREMENTS AVAILABLE TO CONFIRM OPERATION.
OTHER
W






REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 445 ABORT:
ITEM: PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
50V58MT8, 17, 26 (VS70-580999)
ME499-0177-6162 •
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MECHANISM, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE OFF NOMINAL CIRC PUMP CYCLING BY SM SOFTWARE.


































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 446 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS NOT USED FOR CIRC PUMP
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: OFFSCALE HIGH/LOW
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE 'HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: SYSTEM WIDE
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 447 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS MONITORED BY FDAAND USED
FOR CIRC PUMP TEMPERATURE CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: OFFSCALE HIGH/LOW











HYDRAULICS DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SYSTEM W_DE •
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT FOR OFFSCALE HIGH TRANSDUCER. _CIRC. P_PINADVERTANTLY













































QUICK DISCONNECTS-GROUND SERVICING (RETURN)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/i
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 50V58PDI3,15,17 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC621-0024-0800
CAUSES: DAMAGED SEAT/POPPET, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES
PUMP CAVITATION AND LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
m
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












QUICK DISCONNECT-GROUND SERVICING (SUPPLY)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]








CAUSES: DAMAGED SEAT/POPPET, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-144
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 450 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT-HYD. GROUND POWER SUPPLY-LANDING
GEAR STOW/DEPLOY
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULICS DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL


























LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1 FOR LOWERING LANDING GEAR AND BRAKING.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



































3/3 AOA: 27iR 'i
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3















LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE TO ENGINE VALVES ON ONE SSME.
















































LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
w
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :




















REPORT DATE 12_23/86 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULICS DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: 2/iR
DEORBIT: 2/1R AT0: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS[ A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 50V58PD!, 3,5 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC621-0024-0210/0110
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM./LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES







































LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM./LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES






REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-149
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









CHECK VALVE-RETURN LINE FROM ENG'S/ACT'S
FAILS TO CLOSE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVID SON SUBSYS IIEAD" W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














ME284-0434.1020 ....... _" __
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, DAMAGED SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












































CHECK VALVE-RETURN LINE FROM ENG'S/ACT'S
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR





LOSS OF PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL ACROSS TVC ACTUATORS AND SSME
CONTROL VALVES. EXCEED RETURN LINE DESIGN PRESSURE. (NOT A
CREDIBLE FAILURE DURING PRELAUNCH AND LAUNCH PHASES.)
m REFERENCES: V70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULICS DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR _























CAUSES: RUPTURE, SWIVEL LEDGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...............................................................
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. ACTUATOR SWITCHES TO REDUNDANT

























HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS/SSME HYD-SUPPLY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULICS DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL
































CAUSES: RUPTURE, SWIVEL LEAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. ACTUATOR SWITCHES TO REDUNDANT
SYSTEM. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE TO ONE SSME CAUSES CONTROL
VALVE LOCKUP.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY:TVC ACTUATORS/SSME HYD.
RETURN LINES
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE











HYDRAULICS DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL






















CAUSES: RUPTURE, SWIVEL LEAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. ACTUATOR SWITCHES TO REDUNDANT
















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-154
mw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: HOSE AND SWIVEL ASSY: WATER SPRAY BOILERS
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULICS DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE " HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING:. 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: 50V58FH95,96,97,98,99,100 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC277-0002-2160,2161,2162,2163i2164,2165
CAUSES: RUPTURE, SWIVEL LEAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES
PUMP CAVITATION AND LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















NOSE WHEEL STEERING FLEX HOSE ASSEMBLY
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD _ALYST: W. E. P__ SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON •
BRE_O_ HIE_C_:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIB_ION, MONITORING, _D CONTROL



















3/3 AOA: 2/IR __'_
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
2/1R




ME271'0079-I0(03), (15) _ _
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCT_L
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































MAIN LANDING GEAR FLEX HOSE (EXTEND)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL



































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
u

















MAIN LANDING GEAR FLEX HOSE (RETRACT)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL



































NO EFFECT ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF LANDING GEAR.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 464 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: HYDRAULIC LINE
FAILURE MODE: LINE RUPTURE BETWEEN HYDRAULIC PUMPS AND LANDING
GEAR AND MPS/TVC ISOVALVES
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES






















HYDRAULIC LINE (SUPPLY) SYSTEM 1
LINE RUPTURE BETWEEN L.G. ISOVALVES AND L.G.
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDO_ HIERARCHY:
1) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSEg: STRUCTURAL FAILURE _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 466 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: HYDRAULIC LINE (RETURN) SYSTEM 1
FAILURE MODE: LINE RUPTURE BETWEEN L.G. CONTROL VALVES AND L.G.
RETURN LINE CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL






































REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT .......











FAILURE MODE: LINE RUPTURE (HYDRAULIC SUPPLY) BETWEEN MPS/TVC
ISOVALVE AND ACT'S/SSME'S











HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
HYDRAULIC LINE
CRITICALITIES















A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM./LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 468 ABORT: I/I
ITEM: HYDRAULIC LINE
FAILURE MODE: LINE RUPTURE (RETURN) BETWEEN ACT'S/SSME'S AND
RETURN LINE CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF; 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM./LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES
























LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL


























CAUSES: SOLENOID FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















































REDUNDANT SHUTTOFF VALVE (N.O.)
PREMATURE CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL


























CAUSES: SOLENOID FAILURE, PREMATURE ELECTRICAL POWER TO
SOLENOID.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. PROVIDES PREMATURE ISOLATION REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999

















REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE (N.O.)
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW_FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] ccP]
LOCATION: 67V58LV9 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER:- MC621-0046-0005
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






































LANDING GEAR DUMP SOLENOID VALVE (N.C.)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTO FF: /NA TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ !R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR













REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















LANDING GEAR DUMP SOLENOID VALVE (N.C.)
PREMATURE OPEN











HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
L.G. DUMP SOLENOID VALVE (N.C.)
!
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: SOLENOID FAILURE, PREMATURE ELECTRICAL POWER TO
SOLENOID.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT RETURN PATH FROM RETRACT SIDE OF L.G.














































LANDING GEAR DUMP SOLENOID VALVE (N.C.)
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL

























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF LANDING GEAR.
MIGHT REQUIRE DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING.
NOSEWHEEL STEERING
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, M6_TORIq_, _ CONTROL .......








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC A_Oi_T-

















LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/LOSS OF RESERVOIR PRESSURE CAUSES










































LEAKAGE, INTERNAL (ACCUMULATOR TO SYSTEM THRU
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: • 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
•ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BROKEN SPRING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/LOSS OF RESERVOIR PRESSURE CAUSES
LOSS OF PUMP HEAD PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-171
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAKAGE, INTERNAL ACCUMULATOR TO RESERVOIR THRU

































3/3 _ _ "
3/3
211R






LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/LOSS OF RESERVOIR PRESSURE CAUSES

































REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-172
m
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 478 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: ACCUMULATOR DUMP VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE (ACCUMULATOR/RESERVOIR TO SYSTEM)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]




POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM/LOSS OF RESERVOIR PRESSURE






















LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF : /NA TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





LOSS OF HYDRAULIC POWER TO EXTEND LANDING GEAR (SYS 1), LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HYDRAULIC POWER TO BRAKES (SYS 2 & 3), LOSS OF THERMAL




































LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
PREMATURE CLOSE











HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
LANDING GEAR ISO. VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

















SOLENOID SPRING FAILURE, INADVERTANT SIGNAL TO SOLENOID
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC POWER TO EXTEND LANDING GEAR (SYS i), LOSS OF
REDUNDANT HYDRAULIC POWER TO BRAKES (SYS 2 & 3), LOSS OF THERMAL
CONTROL IN SYS 2 & 3.
REFERENCES: V70-580999
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-175
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE











HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
LANDING GEAR ISO. VALVE
CRITICALITIES





















LOSS OF REDUNANT ISOLATION OF LANDING GEAR EXTEND CIRCUITS. LOSS










































LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
PREMATURE OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/!R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES : SOLENOID SPRING FAILURE, INADVERTENT SIGNAL "TO SOLENOID
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT ISOLATION OF LANDING GEAR EXTEND CIRCUITS.





















LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT








3/3 : _ __ •
3/3





CAUSES: DAMAGED SOT_NOID BALL OR SEAT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-178
I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAK











HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL
LANDING GEAR ISO VALVE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58L26, 27, 28 (vs70-580999)
- PARTNUMBER: MC284-0469-0023/MC364-00ii-0052
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSES
PUMP CAVITATION AND LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE POS. INDICATION
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OPEN)
SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSONLEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
2) LANDING GEAR ISO. VALVE
3) L.G. ISO. VALVE POSITION IND.
CRITICALITIE_ ==
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:



























































LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
PREMATURE OPEN (PRESS TO RETRACT/LOCK LINES)
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:












CAUSES: SOLENOID SPRING FAILURE, PREMATURE SOLENOID ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ISOLATION REDUNDANCY FOR HYDRAULIC RETRACT COMMAND. LOSS





REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 487 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (PROVIDE PATH FROM RETRACT/LOCK TO
RETURN LINES)











HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL














3/3 AOA: 2/ IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
2/IR
A[ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
67V58LV25 (VS70-580999)
MC621-0029-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ISOLATION REDUNDANCY FOR HYDRAULICRETRACT COMMAND. LOSS






















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-182
I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
LEAKAGE, INTERNAL





HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
L.G. CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE
CRITI_ALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:














B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: 67V58LV25 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC621-0029-0005
CAUSES: DAMAGED SOLENOID BALL ORSEAT.
LEAKAGE IS TO RETURN PORT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED.
REFERENCES : VS70-580999
w

















LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC SOLENOID VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DE ORB IT: 2/ 1R ATO: 2/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:






RESTRICTOR, HYDRAULIC, L.G. RETRACT LINE
BLOCKED OR RESTRICTED FLOW











HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
L.G. CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE






















LOSS OR DEGRADED EFFECTIVITY OF REDUNDANT PATH FROM RETRACT/LOCK
TO RETURN LINE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMEN_: _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 491 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE-2POS, 3WAY, SOLENOID
OPERATED
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH TO LG EXTEND POSITION
LEADANALYST:W. DAViDSON _ _SUBSYSLEAD:W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:_ _ !_z _:_:_ _ i_-_:._=_.
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONIT0-RING, AND CONTROL






















TAL: 2/1R _ _:
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/IR
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE SOLENOID
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAIL TO GET HYDRAULIC POWER TO LANDING GEAR EXTEND/UNLOCK








































LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE-2POS, 3WAY, SOLENOID
PREMATURE SWITCH TO LGEXTEND POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL
























CAUSES: SOLENOID SPRING FAILURE, PREMATURE SOLENOID ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LANDING GEAR WILL EXTEND WHEN L.G. ISO VALVE IS OPENED AT A
RELATIVE VELOCITY OF 800 FPS. PROBABLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V70-580999












_DING GEM CONTROL VALVE-2POS, 3WAY, SOLENOID
_AK, INTE_AL
_AD _ALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
B_O_ HIE_CHY:
i) _D_ULIC DIS_IBUTION, MONITORING, _D CO_ROL
























CAUSES: DAMAGED SOLENOID BALL OR SEAT
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:














































LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE - 2 POS, 3 WAY,
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
•EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT .....










ITEM: MPS/TVC SHUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER FROM HYDRAULIC POWER MODE TO
THERMAL CONTROL MODE.
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL


























HIGHER THAN EXPECTED HYDRAULIC FLOW CAUSES HIGHER THAN EXPECTED
ELECTRICAL POWER CONSUMPTION BY CIRC. PUMP & HIGHER THAN EXPECTED
USE OF APU FUEL DURING DESCENT BECAUSE OF EXTRA LOAD. LOSS OF






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 496 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: MPS/TVC SHUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE TRANSFER FROM HYDRAULIC POWER MODE TO
THERMAL CONTROL MODE DURING ASCENT.
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: PREMATURE POWER TO SOLENOID, SOLENOID SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER FROM ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM TO TVC ACTUATORS, LOSS OF

















ITEM: MPS/TVC SHUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER FROM THERMAL CONTROL MODE TO
HYDRAULIC POWER MODE FOR ENGINE REPOSITIONING.
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





































































ITEM: MPS/TVC SHUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC DISTRIBUTION, MONITORING, AND CONTROL









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58LV34, •35, 36 (VS70-580999)
PART NUMBER: MC284-0469-0027/MC364-0011-0051
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SUFFICIENT FLUID CAUSE
PUMP CAVITATIONAND LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580999
w
















LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















































LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:

























JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM






































































FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P]










CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
m
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R




























REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-198
I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58PP(4),(5),(6) (VS70-58,0996)










JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS



















LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN rHIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM


























A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION_ 50V58PP(4), (5), (6), (,VS70-580996)
PART _MBER: MC281-0029 •
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/ 1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]




CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099/ NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-201
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[P]














































ITEM: PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •









REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE
FAILS TO MAXIMUM OUTPUT POSITION













PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] siP] c[P]
LOCATION: 50V58PP(4), (5), (6) .(VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC281-0029 •
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE
FAILS TO MINIMUM OUTPUT POSITION













PRESSURE COMPENSATOR SPOOL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58PP(4),(5),(6) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC281-0029
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SPRING FAILURE, BINDING/JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :





JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-205
o
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:






FLEX HOSE (SUCTION) ..........
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION: 50V58PP(4),(5),(6) (VS70-580996)
PART _MBER: _ME271-0079-200 (5), (6), (7)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















































LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM
2) MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP



















REDUNDANCY scREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LO CAT SON:
PART NUMBER:
50V58PP(4), (5), (6) .(VS70-580996)
ME271-0079-102 (i), (2), (3)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM
2) MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT





REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
5ovssPP(4),(5),(6) (vsvo-sso996)







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM DUE TO DEPLETION OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
REFERENCES:
22206































SHAFT SEAL DRAIN PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE













SHAFT SEAL DRAIN PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]






CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:











REPORTDATE 12/23/86 C_209 o
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM
2) MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP
















3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
2/1R AT O: 3/3
2/IR



























































LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM
2) MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58CV(25),(28),(31) (VS70-580996) "
PART NUMBER: ME284-0434-2020
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM
2) MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP


























LOSS OF MAIN PUMP OUTPUT.
PUMP OPERATIONS.











































LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM
2) MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3














JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w



















LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM
2) MAIN HYDRAULIC PUMP








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















REPORT OATE 12123186 C-214
un
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)



























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-215
INDEPENDENT ORB_RASSESSMENT



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] CCP]
LOCATION: 50V58TK(4),(5),(6) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC282-0062-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:











































INTERNAL LEAKAGE (LOW PRESSURE-TO-DRAIN)












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION; 50V58TK(4),(5),(6) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC282-0062-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 627 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE (HIGH PRESSURE-TO-LOW PRESSURE)























2/IR AOA: 2/IR .....
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
2/IR
A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
,LOCATION: 50V58TK(4),(5),(6) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC282-0062-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE WILL EQUALIZE, THEREBY ELIMINATING THE
CAPABILITY TO VARY PRESSURE ON THE STORED FLUID.
_?ERENCES:
22206
































LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN













LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/iR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1 R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :








JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
=
rREPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
CONTROLLED.







































LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE











SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 2/!R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 631 ABORT:
ITEM: LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE

















LOW PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM DUE TO DEPLETION OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
REFERENCES:
22206





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :







JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
i
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-223
o
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFIN G" 3/3





CAUSES: VIBRATION, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
u
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


































































































































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, CALIBRATION SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :






















































































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
m_m
i
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT _- _














































































ITEM: E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDw/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: 50V58AC(II-16) (VS70-5809@6)
PART NUMBER: MC287-0050-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

















ITEM: E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:













CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM

































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
i
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-233
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT



















































ITEM: EXTEND SOLENOID VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN















































JSC-I!174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS












ITEM: EXTEND SOLENOID VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED











E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
EXTEND SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES



















FLUID WILL NOT BE SUPPLIED TO THE EXTEND SWITCHING VALVE AND THE


















JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS B
u
I
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-236
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS












ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN

























































































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
FLOW CONTOL VALVE
CRITICALITIES


























JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
wmm































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
EXTEND SWITCHING VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT


















ACTUATOR CANNOT BE EXTENDED.
REFERENCES:
22206
















































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
EXTEND SWITCHING VALVE
CRITICALITIES



















COULD SLOW RETRACTION OF ACTUATOR DUE TO OPPOSING PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS






ITEM: BYPASS FLOW VALVE



















E.T. UMBILICAL REACT ACTUATOR
BYPASS FLOW VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







PRESSURE TO EXTEND OR RETRACT THE ACTUATOR WOULD BE REDUCED.


























































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
BYPASS FLOW VALVE
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58AC(II-16) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC287-0050-0003












JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
u
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
RESET VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


























REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-244
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





















































































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
DAMPER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT









































































































PRESSURE NEEDED TO SWITCH LOCK VALVE AND RETRACT SWITCHING VALVE





JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-247
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
RETRACT SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _TLS :'
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:








































REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-248
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
RETRACT SOLENOID VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CONTROL POSITION OF RETRACT SOLENOID VALVE.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT-





























E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
LOCK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [_A ] C [NA ]




ACTUATOR CANNOT BE EXTENDED.
REFERENCES:
22206


































FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE












































POSITION OF ACTUATOR IS NOT FIXED.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
RETRACT SWITCHING VALVE
CRITICALITIES


















ACTUATOR CANNOT BE RETRACTED.
REFERENCES:
22206






















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-252
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: RETRACT SWITCHING VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE












E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
RETRACT SWITCHING VALVE
CRITICALITIES






























REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















































CAUSES: FAILS TO OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD CREATE A LEAK IN THE ACTUATOR DUE TO OVERPRESSURIZATION,
























































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
THERMAL RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:" 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







ACTUATOR RETRACTION WILL BE EFFECTED DUE TO UNDERPRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
m
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 668 ABORT:
ITEM: SHAFT DRAIN SEAL
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
SHAFT DRAIN SEAL
CRITICALITIE$
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
I/ANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58AC(II-16) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC287-0050-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :










































ITEM: FLEX HOSE & SWIVEL ASSEMBLY (SUPPLY)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
FLEX HOSE & SWIVEL ASSEMBLY (SUPPLY)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ' ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58FH(82),(84),(86),(88),(90),(92) (VS70-580996).
•PART NUMBER: MC277-0002-2050/2053 -.
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM DUE TO DEPLETION OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
u

















FLEX HOSE & SWIVEL ASSEMBLY (RETURN)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
FLEX HOSE & SWIVEL ASSEMBLY (RETURN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT" 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B ! P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
50V58FH(83), (85), (87), (89),(91),(93) (VS70-580996)
-MC277-0002-2051/2052
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
























































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R











JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NsTs
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B IF] C [P]




HYDRAULIC P_SS_ COULD BE FORCED THROUGH THE E.T. UMBILICAL


















































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATOR
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS














































A [ 2 '] B [ P ] C [ P ]....
S0VSSMV(43), (44), (4S),(46),(4V),.(48)(VSV0-S80996)
ME284-0559-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM DUE TO DEPLETION OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
REFERENCES:
22206







































DRAIN (FROM RESERVOIRS, MAIN PUMPS, AND
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE




























CAUSES:. PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






JSC-II174, JSC£12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
m
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





















































AN INCREASED SUPPLY OF GN2 AND HYDRAULIC FLUID COULD INITIATE AN
EXTERNAL LEAK IN THE DRAIN SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
22206

































ITEM: SHAFT SEAL DRAIN HOSE
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW



































COULD CAUSE AN EXTERNAL LEAK IN THE DRAIN SYSTEM, WHICH WOULD




JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS














SHAFT SEAL DRAIN HOSE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE

































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












































ITEM: SHAFT SEAL MANIFOLD DRAIN
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW













SHAFT SEAL MANIFOLD DRAIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3











JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
u
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-267
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















SHAFT SEAL MANIFOLD DRAIN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










SHAFT SEAL MANIFOLD DRAIN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] " B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58PV28 (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: V070-585413-001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-268
l
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OLEOPHOBIC FILTER (TYPE I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE














OLEOPHOBIC FILTER (TYPE I)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:










JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS









ITEM: SURFACE THERMAL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON
















FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 _:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:




































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: , 50V58S(16),(17),(116_,(I17) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC452-0147-00(28), "(34)
CAUSES: VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TO ALTERNATE HEAT CONTROLLER.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
i__
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-271
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3













SWITCH TO REDUNDANT HEATER.
REFERENCES:
22206



























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
























JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-273
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















OLEOPHOBIC FILTER (TYPE II)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE







































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












































MANIFOLD SHAFT SEAL DRAIN
RESTRICTED FLOW






































COULD INITIATE AN EXTERNAL LEAK WHICH WOULD CONTAMINATE A PORTION
OF THE VERTICAL STABILIZER.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















MANIFOLD SHAFT SEAL DRAIN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE

































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







COULD INITIATE AN EXTERNAL LEAK WHICH WOULD CONTAMINATE A PORTION
OF THE VERTICAL STABILIZER.
REFERENCES_
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
m
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-277
INDEPENDENT QRBITER ASSESSMENT ......
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET







FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































OLEPHOBIC FILTER (TYPE I)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE













OLEOPHOBIC FILTER (TYPE I)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC _
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 70V58FL5 (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC286-0076-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







JSC_II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







































































































































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT r




























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 13/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
"REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
70V58HR4(15A_,(15B),(15C) (VS70-58099,6)'
MC363-0044-00 (sg), (60), (61)
CAUSES: VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: / NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR




MC363-0044-00 (59), (60), (61)
CAUSES: VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:




ITEM: CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)













CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM DUE TO DEPLETION OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
REFERENCES:
22206



































CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN




































OVERPRESSURIZATION COULD TERMINATE CIRCULATION PUMP OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS












ITEM: GSE CHECK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 50V58CV(32), (33), (34) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: ME284-0434-I016 _°
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM DUE TO DEPLETION OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
i •
















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
KEDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]




GROUND OPERATIONS ARE EFFECTED DUE TO BLOCKAGE OF THE SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS

































































REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-288
g
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE












CIRCULATION PUMP CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]




CIRCULATION PUMP DAMAGE COULD OCCUR DURING MAIN PUMP OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























•FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









LOSS OF A PRESSURE TRANSDUCER READING THAT IS USED IN PRIORITY
RATE LIMITING.





















































PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (PRECEDING FILTER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF_ 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58MT(3),(12),(21) (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER_ ME449-0i77-6105 .
CAUSES: VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A PRESSURE TRANSDUCER THAT IS USED IN PRIORITY RATE
LIMITING.




REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (PRECEDING FILTER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT


































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
g
J

































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]




CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
r







































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
































































PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (AFTER FILTER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: - 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3











JSC-III74i Jsc-i2770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
































PRESSURE _SDUCER (AFTER FILTER)
p
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: _/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

































































PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (AFTER FILTER)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:








JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-297
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 713 ABORT:
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)



































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:











































FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN










































REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-299
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUN C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
•LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





SYSTEM COULD BECOME INOPERATIVE IF UNDERPRESSURIZATION OCCURS.
REFERENCES:
22206

































FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS INDICATION













PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (AFTER RELIEF VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3











JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
w
































PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (AFTER RELIEF VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOF_: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





































































PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (AFTER RELIEF VALVE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]






















FAIL_ MODE: EXTE_AL _A_GE



























CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAI_
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:















































































JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-305
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 721 ABORT:
ITEM: RETURN FILTER
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAF ING: 2/IR
































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/i
LIFTOFF" 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R












JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
m_















INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON TO FREON)












FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SUBSYSTEM
FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES



























































INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON-TO-HYDRAULIC FLUID)












FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SUBSYSTEM
FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
















B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


























EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF HYDRAULIC FLUID










FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SUBSYSTEM
FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R















































RESTRICTED FLOW (HYDRAULIC FLUID)












FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SUBSYSTEM
FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R







LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO HEAT HYDRAULIC FLUID IN ONE SYSTEM USING
THE FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER. SYSTEM CAN BE HEATED BY OPERATING
MAIN PUMP OR BARBECUING.
REFERENCES:
22206
JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS














ITEM: FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW (FREON)































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION: 26C (VS70-580996)
PART NUMBER: MC250-0001-0015 _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ONE FREON SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
222O6









































FAILS OPEN (BYPASS MODE)












FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO HEAT ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM USING THE




JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-3i3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAILS OPEN (FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER MODE)












FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58PV(22),(23),(24) (VS70-580996).
PART NUMBER: MC284-0412-0002
CAUSES: P_ECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCULATION PUMP HYDRAULIC FLUID WILL BE CONTINUOUSLY HEATED.


















JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
u
I


















ITEM: THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR













JSC-II174, JSC-12770, VS70-580996, VS70-958099, NSTS
=
w














ITEM: THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE












FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGERS SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 50V58PV(22),(23),(24) (VS70-580996)
•PART NUMBER: MC284-0412-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















































































SiP]A [ 2 ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73A4 (VS70-580109)
PART NUMBER: A6RI
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

































































































FAILURE MODE: OPEN/SHORT TO GROUND





































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
w
=
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 37
OPEN












MID-BODY POWER CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 37
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







































REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 37
CONTINUOUS OUTPUT












MID-BODY POWER CONTROL ASSEMBLY 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 37
CRITICALITIES




DEORBIT: _ /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA



















VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL


































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ONE SET OF RUDDER/SPEED BRAKE, BODY FLAP A, AND
BODY FLAP B HEATERS.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12











































































VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-323
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF POWER TO ONE SET OF RUDDER/SPEED BRAKE, BODY FLAP A, AND









































































VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-325
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 40
OPEN











HYDRAULIC HEATER AFT FUSELAGE
MID-BODY POWER CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 40
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26 (VS70-580109)
PART NUMBER:
C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ONE SET OF RUDDER/SPEED BRAKE, BODY FLAP A, AND












































REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 40
CONTINUOUS OUTPUT











HYDRAULIC HEATER AFT FUSELAGE
MID-BODY POWER CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER NO. 40
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA










REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12

















FUSE 51, 52, 53
OPEN











HYDRAULIC HEATER AFT FUSELAGE
MID-BODY POWER CONTROL ASSEMBLY 2
FUSE 51, 52, 53
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO BODY FLAP A HEATERS NO. i, BODY FLAPB HEATER I,






































ITEM: THERMOSTAT (S16, S17, $4)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN










HYDRAULIC HEATER AFT FUSELAGE
AFT BODY
THERMOSTAT ($16, S17, $4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 70V58S4 (VS70-580109)
PART NUMBER:
.B [ P] c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO BODY FLAP 1 HEATER I, BODY FLAP B HEATER I,
RUDDER SPEED BRAKE HEATER i, RESPECTIVELY. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























HYDRAULIC HEATER AFT FUSELAGE
AFT BODY
THERMOSTAT (S16, SIT, $4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO" /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF POWER TO BODY FLAP A HEATER I, BODY FLAP B HEATER I,
RUDDER SPEED BRAKE HEATER I, RESPECTIVELY.


















































E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATORS


















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT











E.T. UMBILICAL RETRACT ACTUATORS
AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
MASTER EVENTS CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA














































POWER CONTACTOR (K3, K4)
OPEN












AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
AFT POWER CONTACTOR ASSEMBLY NO. 4
POWER CONTACTOR (K3, K4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-333
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















POWER CONTACTOR (K3, K4)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT












AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
AFT POWER CONTACTOR ASSEMBLY NO. 4
POWER CONTACTOR (K3, K4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA ' RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNTIL SECOND FAILURE (SECOND CONTACTOR ENERGIZES).









































HYBRID DRIVER (K3), AR TYPE III
INADVERTENT OUTPUT







i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
3) AFT LOAD CONTROL ASSEMBLY NO. 1
4) HYBRID DRIVER (K3)
AR TYPE III
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. HYD CIRC PUMP SW TO OFF WILL DEACTIVATE THE AFFECTED
PUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-335
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (K3), AR TYPE iiI
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












AFT AVIONICS BAY 4




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA '
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONdRBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:












































HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE III
OPEN












AFT AVIONICS BAY 4

























REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12

















HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE III
INADVERTENT OUTPUT











AFT AVIONICS BAY 4




















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. REQUIRES SECOND FAILURE (K-4 DRIVER FAILS ON).




































HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE II
INADVERTENT OUTPUT












AFT AVIONICS BAY 4




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
L
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-339
C-
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE II
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
























CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTOMATIC CIRC PUMP SHUT-OFF DURING APU START.







































ITEM: RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER - 1.2K
FAILURE MODE: SHORT



































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E_ SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER - 1.2K
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIGNAL TO FWD LCA #2.
NO EFFECT - GROUND USE ONLY.








































BLOCKING DIODE - 3A
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2 ) AFT LCA























CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. ONLY ONE LCA IS ACTIVE AT ANY GIVEN TIME. SHORT




VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
n
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















BLOCKING DIODE - 3A
OPEN













BLOCKING DIODE - 3A
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. ONLY ONE LCA IS ACTIVE AT ANY GIVEN TIME. IF
REDUNDANT LCA WAS ACTIVE THE OPEN DIODE WOULD PREVENT TURNING OFF
THE REDUNDANT LCA DRIVER.











































RESISTOR CURRENT LIMITER - 5.1K
SHORT











RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER - 5.1K
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 55V76AI22 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER: _
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH SIGNAL INPUT TO MDM.
MISSION OR CREW SAFETY.
ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENT. NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-345
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER - 5.1K
OPEN












RESISTORS CURRENT LIMITER - 5.1K
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT SIGNAL TO MDM.
SAFETY.





















VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL m
l
I













ITEM: RESISTORS - VOLTAGE DIVIDERS - 1.8K
FAILURE MODE: SHORT













RESISTORS - VOLTAGE DIVIDERS - 1.8K
• CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT SIGNAL TO MDM.
SAFETY.




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT12
m
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-347
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RESISTORS - VOLTAGE DIVIDERS - 1.8K
OPEN













RESISTORS - VOLTAGE DIVIDERS - 1.8K
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH INPUT TO MDM.
= .
OR CREW SAFETY.












































LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










CURRENT LIMITER RESISTORS - 2.15K
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH INPUT SIGNAL TO MDM. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MEASUREMENT.








VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-349
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












CURRENT LIMITER RESISTORS 2.15K
OPEN













CURRENT LIMITER RESISTORS - 2.15K
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT SIGNALS TO MDM.
SAFETY.



















VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL g
m
mm























BLOCKING DIODE - 3A
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2 ) AFT LCA
























CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) AFT LCA








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS-: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 55V76A122 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT SIGNAL FROM GPC SW POSITION TO HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE
III. NO EFFECT. REQUIRES SECOND FAILURE (LOSS OF SECOND
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM).





















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-352
mm
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















BLOCKING DIODE - MDM CIRCUIT 3A
SHORT













BLOCKING DIODE - MDM CIRCUIT 3A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS :














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSS OF ISOLATION BETWEEN THE MDM AND THE CIRC PUMP




VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-353
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 837 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE - MDM CIRCUIT 3A
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) AFT LCA







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF MDM INPUT TO HYBRID DRIVER WITH THE CIRC PUMP SW (S29) IN










































BLOCKING DIODES SW "ON" CIRCUIT (3A)
SHORT













BLOCKING DIODES SW "ON" CIRCUIT (3A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA











REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-355
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_










ITEM: BLOCKING DIODES SW "ON" CIR_IT (3A)
FAILLE MODE: OPEN













BLOCKING DIODES SW "ON" CIR_IT (3A)
_ITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE _UNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THER_L ST_SS,
CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TION_:









































ITEM: CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR, 1'21K
FAILURE MODE: OPEN













CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR, 1.21K
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
















LOSS OF CONTROL VOLTAGE TO HYBRID DRIVER TYPE III.
REDUNDANCY.







VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL














HYD CIRC PUMP SW 29
FAILS IN "ON" POSITION (ALL CONTACTS)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) PANEL R2








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS :













CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :











































HYD CIRC PUMP SW 29
FAILS IN "OFF" POSITION (ALL CONTACTS)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) PANEL R2








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FU_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFIMG: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2 (VST0-580109E) -
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF THERMAL CYCLE AND RESERVOIR REPRESS CAPABILITY USING CIRC
PUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-580i09E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-359
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYD CIRC PUMP SW 29
FAILS IN GPC POSITION (ALL CONTACTS)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) PANEL R2








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LAND/NG/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: . 32V73A2 (VS70-580109E).
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ :
LOSS OF MANUAL CIRC PUMP OPERATION. NORMAL POSITION IS "GPC".


































CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR, 1.21K
OPEN













PWR SW25 - MN B
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR, 1.21K
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS :














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE CONTROL VOLTAGE TO HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III.





REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLESYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12













LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) PANEL R2
3) CONTROL BUS






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB IT: 3/1R AOA: /NA





A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
36V73AI2 (VS70-58QI09E)
.
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































FAILS IN MN A/MN B (ALL CONTACTS)
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC CIRC PUMP
2) PANEL AI2








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RT LS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
L









ITEM: HYDRAULIC FLUID QUANTITY METER, CB 57
















HYDRAULIC FLUID QUANTITY METER
CB 57
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ' ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW SAFETY.
WITH GN2 PRESS AND TEMP_

















VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL m
mm
D
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-364
l
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC MAIN PUMP
2) DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
3) AFT LCA






















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. RPC FAILED ON (SECOND FAILURE) WOULD ENERGIZE DEPRESS
SOLENOID. LOSS OF SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12














HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV
LOSS OF OUTPUT












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
AFT LCA
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV
CRITICALITIES




DEORBI T: 3/1R AT0:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA











CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



































FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB_T: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. RETURN DRIVER FAILED ON (SECOND FAILURE) WOULD




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT


































VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :













































BLOCKING DIODE, GROUND MDM (-IA,-3A)
SHORT












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
AFT PCA, AFT LCA
BLOCKING DIODE, GROUND MDM (-1A,-3A)
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ISOLATION OF MDM FROM VEHICLE COMMANDS.
FLIGHT OPS.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12



















_AD _ALYST: J. D_AL SUBSYS _AD: W. DAVIDSON
B_DO_ HIE_C_:
I) _D_ULIC _IN _MP
2) DEP_SS VLV SO_NOID CIR_IT
3) AFT PCA, AFT LCA





































CAUSES: VIB_TION, MEC_I_L SHOCK, THER_L ST_SS,
CONT_INATION
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT OPS.
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
_SS OF INP_ FROM MDM.
_FE_NCES: VS70-SS0109E, SPACE S_TTT._ SYSTEMS _DBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12 i
w
I





















BLOCKING DIODES, GROUND MDM (-IA,-3A)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC MAIN PUMP
2) DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
3) AFT PCA, AFT LCA







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:











CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF POWER TO REDUNDANT RPC AND DRIVER.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12






























DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
AFT PCA, AFT LCA
BLOCKING DIODES, (-IA,-3A)
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON FLIGHT OPS.
GROUND COMMAND.







































RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (2.15K)
SHORT












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
AFT PCA
RESISTOR CURRENT LIMITER (2.15K)
CRITICALITIES















CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH INPUT SIGNAL TO MDM. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MEASUREMENT.







VS70-580109E, SPACESHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (2.15K)
OPEN











DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
AFT PCA
RESISTOR CURRENT LIMITER (2.15K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT TO MDM. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW SAFETY.






































RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)
SHORT







i) HYDRAULIC MAIN PUMP
2) DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
3) AFT PCA
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS"













CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH INPUT TO MDM RESULTING IN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MEASUREMENT.
EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW SAFETY.
NO




REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-375
INDEPENDENTOR_ITE_SESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 859 ABORT:

















DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
AFT PCA
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)
_ _ =
C_RITICA-LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO INPUT TO MDM. LOSS OF MEASUREMENT.
CREW SAFETY.


















































SWITCH, HYD MAIN PUMP PRESS ($26,27,28)
FAILS IN "NORM" POSITION (ALL CONTACTS)












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
PANEL R2
SWITCH, HYD MAIN PUMP PRESS ($26,27,28)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATo: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-377
o
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 861 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, HYD MAIN PUMP PRESS ($26,27,28)
FAILS IN "LOW" POSITION (ALL CONTACTS)







DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
PANEL R2







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC . ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS POWER TO DEPRESS SOLENOID. UNABLE TO PRESSURIZE
AFFECTED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LOSS OF SYSTEM.


















































2) DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
3) AFT PCA, AFT LCA
RESISTOR (I.8K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI21, 55V76AI35, 55V76AI34 (VS70-580109E)
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT TO MDM.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-379
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:








































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH INPUT TO MDM RESULTING IN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.



















VST0-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL II
I
I














































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-381
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAT._:
HIGH INPUT TO MDM RESULTING IN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF THE MDM.























VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTT_ SYSTEMS _DBOOK, VOL []
ms
I




























































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO ENERGIZE DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID.
LOSS OF FUNCTION.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-383
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K)
SHORT












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
PANEL R2
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K, AgR2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON TURNING ON THE RETURN CIRCUIT DRIVER. LOSS OF

















VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
I
i





















CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K)
OPEN












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
PANEL R2
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (1.21K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATI ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO ENERGIZE DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL

















CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K)
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
PANEL R2














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73A2 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK' THERMAL STRESS,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:














































CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (1.21K)
SHORT












DEPRESS VLV SOLENOID CIRCUIT
PANEL R2
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (1.21K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT• HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON ENERGIZING DEPRESS SOLENOID.
BUSES FROM FAILURE DOWNSTREAM.
LOSS OF PROTECTION TO
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-387.
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME_

































FLIG_ P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: /NA RT_: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: /NA
ONO_IT: /NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
_DING/SAFING: /NA




_USES: VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THE_AL ST_SS
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
NO EFFECT ON ENERGIZING DEP_SS SOT._NOID. SWITCHING HYD MAIN
_P P_SS SW TO NOeL MAY DA_GE __ CIR_IT DRIVER WITH THE



















VS70-S80i09E, SPACE S_TT_ SYS_S _DBOOK, VOL m
w
i






















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






























CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO ENERGIZE DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID.
NO PATH THROUGH REDUNDANT RETURN DRIVER.
REFERENCES :
II, SECT 12
VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: / NA RTLS:














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
NO EFFECT ON ENERGIZING THE DEPRESS SOLENOID. LACK OF PROTECTION







































































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO ENERGIZE DEPRESS VALVE SOLENOID.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT RPC.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12














LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW
FAILS IN "CLOSE" POSITION (ALL CONTACTS)











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
PANEL R4
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW , ±
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:















































FAILS IN "GPC" POSITION (ALL CONTACTS)











MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RETRACT CIRC VALVE
PANEL R4
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
•LOCATION: 32V73A4 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCKi STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RETRACT/CIRC VALVE STAYS ENERGIZED WHEN CIRC PUMP IS ON.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-393
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 877 ABORT:
ITEM: LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW















MAIN HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
RE_/CIRC VALVE
PANEL R4
LG RETRACT/CIRC VLV SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT














CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RETRACT/CIRC VALVE STAYS ENERGIZED UNTIL LG ARM IS INITIATED.
VALVE MAY STICK IN OPEN POSITION DUE TO EXCESSIVE HEATING IF






















REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-394
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















LOSS OF OUTPUT (OPEN, SHORT)











MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: • 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] " B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73A4 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. AVAILABLE TEMPS, PRESSURES PROVIDE DATA TO DETERMINE
VALVE POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12 _
w

















RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (I.21K)
OPEN/SHORT











MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
INDICATOR POWER
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (I.2K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A INA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI2 (VS70-580109E) ..... -
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR - NO POWER TO OPEN/CLOSE INDICATION OR MDM - NO
EFFECT. VALVE POSITION CAN BE DETERMINED BY PRESSURES AND TEMPS.
SHORT - NO CURRENT LIMITING, NO BUS PROTECTION FROM ELECTRICAL
FAILURES DOWNSTREAM (SECOND FAILURE).

































ITEM: RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/SHORT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
RESISTOR, CURRENT LIMITER (5.1K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
' PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-397
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_












B_CKING DIODE, "C_SE" GRO_D COMM_D
OPEN/SHORT












MPS/TVC ISO_TION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)


















_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
_CATION: 54V76AI2 (VS70"580109E) ....
P_T _.MBER:
C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIB_TION, THE_AL ST_SS, MEC_ICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:









































BLOCKING DIODE (RETURN CIRCUIT)
SHORT











MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
BLOCKING DIODE (RETURN CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC'
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ISOLATION BETWEEN GROUND AND VEHICLE COMMANDS - NO EFFECT
IN FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-399
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















B_CKING DIODE (__ CIR_iT)
OPEN












MPS/TVC ISO_TION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] ccP]
_CATION: S4V76AI2 (VS70-580109E)
P_T _MBER:
CAUSES: THE_AL ST_SS, VIB_TION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
_SS OF _PABILITY TO COMM_D VALVE. AOA - LIMIT R_TIME OF















_FE_NCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE S_TT_ SYSTEMS _DBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12 lii
I




















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV, RETURN CIRCUIT
CONTINUOUS OUTPUT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV, RETURN CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT : /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R











NO EFFECT, CLOSE DRIVER MUST BE ENERGIZED TO CLOSE VALVE (SECOND
FAILURE). IF SECOND FAILURE OCCURS, ENGINE THROTTLE VALVES WILL
LOCK IN CURRENT POSITION.
REFERENCES:
II, SECT 12
VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 885 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV, RETURN CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV, RETURN CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT















CAUSES: OPEN, THERMAL STRESS, SHORT TO GROUND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CANNOT OPERATE ISO VALVE.
CONSERVE APU FUEL/ ....













































HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV CLOSE CIRCUIT
CONTINUOUS OUTPUT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV CLOSE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _DW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:















CONTINUOUS OUTPUT HAS NO EFFECT WITHOUT THE RETURN DRIVER TURNED
ON (SECOND FAILURE). RETURN DRIVER ACTIVATION WOULD CLOSE VALVE.
VALVE CLOSURE WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF HYDRAULIC POWER TO THE
ENGINE CONTROL VALVE. •LOSS OF ME CONTROL DURING THROTTLE
BACK (IN THE "BUCKET") WOULD CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12

















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV CLOSE CIRCUIT
LOSS OF OUTPUT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV CLOSE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCA_'IO_: 54VV6A121 (VSV0-S80109E).
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE ON ORBIT. NO EFFECT ON NORMAL


















VS70-S80109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL i
m
i






















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV OPEN CIRCUIT
CONSTANT OUTPUT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, VLV CLOSE CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






VLV IS IN OPEN POSITION FOR LAUNCH. CONSTANT OUTPUT HAS NO
EFFECT UNTIL RETURN DRIVER IS ENERGIZED. WHEN CLOSE COMMAND IS
ACTIVATED, THE RETURN DRIVER WILL BE TURNED ON. WITH BOTH OPEN
AND CLOSED COMMAND ON THE VALVE, MECHANICAL PROPERTIES WILL
DETERMINE WHICH COMMAND WILL BE EFFECTIVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12































MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)























CAUSES: OPEN, THERMAL STRESS, SHORT TO GROUND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO COMMAND VALVE OPEN. VALVE OPEN FOR LAUNCH.








































BLOCKING DIODE, 3A, CLOSE CIRCUIT
OPEN/SHORT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
BLOCKING DIODE, 3A, CLOSE CIRCUIT
HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUN C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR





A[ 2 ] B[ P] c [P]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN - LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE ISO VALVE. INCREASES APU FUEL
USAGE. LIMITING RUN TIME OF APU DURING AOA REQUIRED TO CONSERVE




VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-407
INDEPENDENTORBITER_SESSMENT ....














MPs/Tvc ISO VLV CONTROL SW :_::_:_
INADVERTENT/PREMATURE OPERATION












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
MPS/TVC ISO VLV CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY scREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 32V73A4 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE NORMALLY CLOSED AFTER MECO. OPENING VALVE DURING DESCENT
AFFECTS A_ FUEL USAGE. LIMIT RUNTIME OF APU DURING DESCENT MAY














DURING LIFTOFF - LOSS OF HYDRAULIC _WER TO ENGINE CONTROL
VALVE. LOSS IN "BUC_T" POSSIB_ LOSS OF VEHICLE & CREW.























MPS/TVC ISO VLV CONTROL SW
FAILS IN CENTER POSITION












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)

















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE ISO VALVE.
CONSERVE APU FUEL FOR AOAo
LIMIT APU RUN TIME TO
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12












CURRENT LIMITERRESISTOR (1.21K) RETURN DRIVER
SHORT












MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (1.21K) RETURN DRIVER POWER CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3

















































CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) RETURN POWER
OPEN













MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) RETURN POWER CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RETURN PATH PREVENTS OPERATING ISO VALVE. LIMIT RUN TIME
OF APU TO CONSERVE APU FUEL FOR AOA.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12












ITEM: CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) OPEN/CLOSE
DRIVERS POWER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ....
2) MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
























CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


















VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL i
g
I













CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) POWER CONTROL
OPEN











MPS/TVC ISOLATION VALVE (SYSTEMS 1,2,3)
CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (I.21K) POWER CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R










CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF CONTROL BUS VOLTAGE PREVENTS OPERATION OF SOLENOID VALVE.
LIMIT RUN TIME OF APU TO CONSERVE APU FUEL FOR AOA.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS:" A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 54V76AI21 (VS70-580109E)
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. THE MAIN DC BUS AND GSE BUS ARE BOTH 28V.
















REFERENCES: VST0-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12 'm
I
U

















ISOLATION DIODE (SYSTEM I)
OPEN












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
AFT LCA
ISOLATION DIODE (SYSTEM 1)
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES : OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-415
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (CLOSE)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
AFT LCA
CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (CLOSE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE . HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL:
•ONORB IT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR









CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS POWER TO THE "CLOSE" SOLENOID WOULD PREVENT THE ISO
VALVE FROM OPENING. THIS FAILURE WOULD PREVENT LOWERING THE LG












VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL g
g
J



















CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (CLOSE)
LOSS OF OUTPUT







1) HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
2) LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
3) AFT LCA
CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (CLOSE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ON OR BIT: / NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA




CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE LG ISO VALVE. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR
CREW/VEHICLE AFTER LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLESYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12














CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (OPEN)
LOSS OF OUTPUT












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
AFT LCA
CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (OPEN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT'
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:













CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE sYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12














ITEM: CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (OPEN)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
AFT LCA
CONTROLLER, HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (OPEN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/iR





A[ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LGISO VLV OPENS PREMATURELY. FAILURE OF LG CONTROL VALVE WOULD





VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL


















































CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATIO N ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PANEL INDICATION. POSSIBLE ERRONEOUS INDICATION.






















LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL SUBSYS LEAD: W. DAVIDSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 1
2) LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
3 ) AFT LCA






















CAUSES: VIBRATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






VST0-S80109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL












ITEM: MDM INPUT CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (5.1K)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/SHORT












U_DiNG GE_ _SOI_TION VALVE
PANEL R4
MDM INPUT CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (5.1K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 •
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
,LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN RESISTOR PREVENTS MDM INPUT TO ISO VALVE MONITOR CIRCUIT.
SHORTED RESISTOR PROVIDES NO CURRENT LIMITING TO MONITOR CIRCUIT.
NO EFFECT 0NMISSION OR VEHICLE OPERATIONS. E_ONEOUS OUTPUT.






































ITEM: ISOLATION DIODE (MONITOR CIRCUIT)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN/SHORT












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
AFT LCA
ISOLATION DIODE (MONITOR CIRCUIT)
CRITICALITIES












B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN DIODE PREVENTS GSE POWER TO THE MONITOR CIRCUIT. SHORTED
DIODE PROVIDES NO PROTECTION BETWEEN GND AND VEHICLE BUSES. NO
EFFECT ON MISSION OR VEHICLE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
=
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-423
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CURRENT LIMITER RESISTOR (1.2K)
OPEN











LANDING G_ISOLATION VAL_ _
AFT LCA




















B [NA ]. C [NA ]
LOCATION:-
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING IN MONITORING CIRCUIT. NO EFFECT IN
















VST0-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
D
l
















ITEM: GSE ISOLATION DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN - SHORT
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: / NA
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: / NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN PREVENTS GSE OPEN/CLOSE COMMANDS. DOES NOT AFFECT
MISSION OR VEHICLE OPERATIONS. A SHORT PROVIDES NO ISOLATION




VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-425
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_OCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN LG DOWN COMMAND. LOSS OF GPC/MDM "OPEN"
COMMAND. SECOND FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1 (OPEN DIODE, SW FAILURE)














VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL I
m




















ITEM: VEHICLE ISOLATION DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PARTNUMBER:
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PATH TO "OPEN" DRIVER. LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPEN ISO VALVE
USING THE SW. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-427
/
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LG HYDRAULIC ISOLATION VLV SW
INADVERTENTLY CONDUCTS (OPEN POSITION)












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
PANEL R4
LG HYDRAULIC ISOLATION VLV SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
















PREMATURE OPENING OF ISO VLVHAS NO EFFECT UNTIL A SECOND














REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12 m
m






















LG HYDRAULIC ISOLATION VLV SW
INADVERTENTLY CONDUCTS (CLOSE POSITION)













LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
PANEL R4
LG HYDRAULIC ISOLATION VLV SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:.
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF LG CLOSE DRIVER.
GPC COMMAND OPEN WILL OPEN VALVE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12















LGHYDRAULIC ISOLATION VLV SW
FAIL TO CLOSE












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
PANEL R4














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION : "
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL OF LG ISO VLV. VLV OPERATED BY GPC






































ISO VLV CTL CIRCUIT RESISTOR (1.21K)
OPEN












LANDING GEAR ISOLATION VALVE
PANEL R4
ISO VLV CTL CIRCUIT RESISTOR (1.21K)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 2/IR _
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
PANEL R4 SWITCH CANNOT OPEN LG HYDRAULIC ISO VALVE. VALVE IS
OPERATED BY THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-580109E, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, VOL
II, SECT 12






































WATER SPRAY BOILER RESTRICTED FLOW
ASSEMBLY




HEAT EXCHANGER RESTRICTED FLOW
ASSEMBLY
HEAT EXCHANGER ASSY EXT_ItL_KAGE
HEAT EXCHANGER ASSY CORE LEAKAGE
HEAT EXCHANGER ASSY HEADER LEAKAGE
SPRAY VALVE _W_T=_ _-A_LS-T0--_PEN ......
SUPPLY)
SPRAY VALVE (WATER FAILS TO CLOSE/LEAKAGE
SUPPLY)
BOILER TANK HEATERS SHORTED

































LEAKAGE - H20 EXTERNAL













FAILS IN BYPASS POSITION
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE























































































































































































LINE RUPTURE BETWEEN HYDRAULIC
PUMPS AND LANDING GEAR AND
MPS/TVC ISOVALVES
LINE RUPTURE BETWEEN L.G.
ISOVALVES AND L.G. CONTROL
VALVES
LINE RUPTURE BETWEEN L.G.
CONTROL VALVES AND L.G.




LINE RUPTURE (RETURN) BETWEEN








TO SYSTEM THRU CHECK VALVE)
LEAKAGE, INTERNAL ACCUMULATOR








PREMATURE OPEN (PRESS TO
RETRACT/LOCK LINES)
FAILS TO CLOSE (PROVIDE PATH
FROM RETRACT/LOCK TO RETURN
LINES)
EXTERNAL LEAK































































































FAILS TO SWITCH TO LG EXTEND
POSITION
PREMATURE SWITCH TO LG EXTEND
POSITION
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS TO TRANSFER FROM
HYDRAULIC POWER MODE TO
THERMAL CONTROL MODE.
PREMATURE TRANSFER FROM
HYDRAULIC POWER MODE TO
THERMAL CONTROL MODE DURING
ASCENT.
FAILS TO TRANSFER FROM
THERMAL CONTROL MODE TO













FAILS TO MAXIMUM OUTPUT POSITION

































































FLEX HOSE & SWIVEL
ASSEMBLY (SUPPLY)



























































INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON TO FREON)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (FREON-TO-
HYDRAULIC FLUID)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID
RESTRICTED FLOW (HYDRAULIC FLUID)
RESTRICTED FLOW (FREON)




















































HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IV
RPC
SWITCH, HYD MAIN PUMP
PRESS (S26,27,28)


























FAILS IN "NORM" POSITION (ALL
CONTACTS)
















CONTROLLER, HYBRID .INADVERTENT OUTPUT
DRIVER, TYPE III (CLOSE)
CONTROLLER, HYBRID LOSS OF OUTPUT
DRIVER, TYPE III (OPEN)
CONTROLLER, HYBRID








ISO VLV CTL CIRCUIT
RESISTOR (I.21K)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
N
OPEN
INADVERTENTLY CONDUCTS (OPEN
POSITION)
INADVERTENTLY CONDUCTS (CLOSE
POSITION)
OPEN
w
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